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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN K. FLORENCE,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

:

vs.

:

DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E. HOLMES, :
HOLMES REALTY, a Utah Corporation,
JAMES R. GADDIS, GADDIS INVEST:
MENTS, a Utah Corporation,

Supreme Court
No. 20813

Defendants-Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether there are genuine issues of material fact

which would preclude summary judgment.
2.

Whether the alleged oral contract is enforceable.

3.

Whether the alleged implied agreement is

enforceable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.

This case is a suit on a

certain alleged oral and/or implied contract among licensed real
estate brokers and salesmen.

Calvin Florence ("Florence")

claimed the said contract was made with DeWayne Iverson
("Iverson"), Bruce Holmes, Holmes Realty, James Gaddis, and
Gaddis Investments ("Gaddis").

On September 27, 1984, Florence

brought suit against the above-named parties for breach of the
alleged contract.

(R 1.)

Gaddis brought a motion for summary

judgment which was granted on March 21f 1985f dismissing the
action against Gaddis with prejudice for the reason that the
deposition of Florence established that Gaddis had no contract of
any kind with Gaddis, oral or implied, to share future fees with
Florence.

(R 30, 51.)

Florence did not appeal that judgment.

Iverson then brought a similar motion for summary judgment which
was granted on June 27, 1985 dismissing the action against
Iverson with prejudice.
Florence appeals.

(R 84.)

It is this ruling from which

Florence filed his Notice of Appeal on July

27, 1985, while the claims against defendants Holmes and Holmes
Realty were still pending.

(R 87.)

On October 30, 1985,

Florence moved to dismiss his Complaint against Holmes and Holmes
Realty, and that motion was granted on the same day.
2.

Statement of Facts.

This suit arises out of an

abortive attempt to sell the Karen Lee Apartments which took
place during the late Summer and Fall of 1983.

The record shows

that on or about August 23, 1983, Gaddis contacted Florence and
asked if he knew of any apartment complexes which were for sale.
(R 89, Deposition of Calvin Florence, 12/13/84, p.8 [hereinafter
"Depo."].)

Florence responded that he did not have one himself,

but knew of one that may be for sale.

(R 89; Depo., p.8.)

Thereafter, Florence contacted Iverson and told him that Gaddis
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wanted information on the Karen Lee apartments, a complex on
which Iverson previously had a listing.
10.)

(R 89, Depo., pp. 9,

Iverson was unwilling to release the information without a

written agreement respecting sharing of fees.
Iverson requested that Florence obtain a letter
from Gaddis setting out in a legally binding written form the
terms of the commission split among the three brokers.
Depo., p. 10.)

(R 89,

Florence stated, "I will contact Gaddis and have

him write the letter and get it to you this afternoon and then
you can give him the information [on the Karen Lee]."
Depo., p. 10.)

)R 89,

After receiving the requested letter from Gaddis,

Florence took it to Iverson's office and delivered it to him.
Upon receipt of the letter, Iverson delivered to Florence the
information on the Karen Lee Apartments.
12-13.)

(R 89, Depo., pp.

Florence alleges and testified in his deposition that he

thereafter requested and obtained from Iverson an oral assurance
that if Iverson knew of any other property, that the commission
arrangement would remain the same should Gaddis1 clients purchase
the other property.

(R 89, Depo., pp.14-15.)

The Karen Lee Apartments were not purchased by
Gaddis1 clients.

Several months later Gaddis and Iverson

participated as real estate agents in arranging a sale of the
Brittany Apartments, a different property from the Karen Lee.
89, Depo., p. 16.)

(R

Florence claims to be owed a one-third share

of the commission for the sale of the Brittany Apartments.
-3-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Florence's Complaint alleges two causes of action
against defendants.

The first cause of action seeks enforcement

of an alleged oral contract which Flornce contends was made
between himself and Iverson.

The second cause of action seeks

enforcement of an alleged implied agreement among the parties
based on a custom and practice in the community.
Florence's claim that he had an oral contract must fail
for two reasons:

First, the alleged promise of Iverson, if given

at all, was given without consideration and therefore is
unenforceable.

Second, no agreement was obtained from Gaddisf a

necessary party to formation of the alleged contract for a
three-way sharing of fees.
Florence contends that he received a promise from
Iverson to apply the terms of a written contract to certain
future transactions.

The contract provides for a three-way split

of any commission earned on the sale of the Karen Lee Apartments.
Florence was to receive a portion of the commission because of
his bringing Gaddis and Iverson together on the proposed sale.
Florence contends that this contract was extended by Iverson to
include any commission earned on the sale of any other apartments
which involved Iverson, Gaddis, and the persons who were the
clients of Gaddis at the time the written contract was made.

The

alleged promise by Iverson was given after Florence had performed
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his duties under the written contract.

In eliciting the alleged

promise, Florence did not suffer further legal detriment or do or
promise or undertake to do anything.
given without consideration.

The alleged promise was

Accordingly, even if the promise

had been givenf it is unenforceable for lack of consideration.
Further, the written contractf which Florence contends
was extended by the alleged promise of Iverson, provides that
Gaddis will split among the three parties any commission Gaddis
receives on the said transaction.

In order for such an agreement

to come into existencef Gaddis' consent is required.

Gaddis*

consent was necessary as it was Gaddis, not Iverson, who would
receive the commission check and would have to be bound to share
it if the alleged contract were to come into existence.

Florence

testified that Gaddis did not consent to the alleged extension.
As Iverson made no legally binding promise to share any
commission he received from Gaddis, and as Gaddis did not agree
to share his commission on any sale except a sale of the Karen
Lee Apartmentsf Florence's claim to the benefit of the claimed
contract must fail.
Florence's claim that he is entitled to share the
Brittany commission on the basis of an implied contract must also
fail for two reasons:

First, Florence does not qualify to

benefit under the implied contract he alleges to exist.

Second,

the lower Court's decision dismissing Florence's action against
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Gaddis set the law of the case and Iverson cannot be charged uner
an agreement to share a Gaddis commission when Gaddis has already
been freed from any obligation to share that very same
commission.

The lower Court's decision granting judgment in

favor of Gaddis applies with equal force to Florence's claim
against Iverson and precludes judgment against Iverson alone*
Florence testified that the alleged custom or trade
practice which he claimed to give rise to the implied agreement
was the legal consequence of the participation of more than one
broker*

It is uncontested that Florence did not participate in

any fashion in the sale of the Brittany Apartments.

Therefore,

even if there were a custom and trade practice which created an
implied agreement in case of multiple broker participation, by
his own statement Florence does not qualify to participate in any
fee arising from the Brittany sale.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's
cause against Respondent should be affirmed
because Appellant's own testimony shows that
the alleged contract is either unenforceable
or lacks the consent of a necessary party.
For purposes of this appeal the facts are assumed to be
those set out by Florence in his deposition.

They show that the

alleged oral contract between Florence and Iverson is
unenforceable for two reasons:

Firstr the alleged contract,
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whether oral or implied, lacks consideration; and second, the
alleged contract, whether oral or implied, lacks the agreement of
Gaddis, who is a necessary party to the formation of the alleged
contract.
A.

The alleged oral contract is unenforceable because

of a lack of consideration.
Rule 2(g), Rules of Practice in the Third Judicial
District Court, requires that the points and authorities in
support of a dispositive motion begin with separately numbered
statements of material facts as to which the movant contends no
genuine issue of fact exists.

Under Section (h) of this rule,

all material facts set forth in the statement of movant are
deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party.
In the present case, the affidavit of Fallentine, and the
memorandum to which it was attached, were not timely filed and
for that reason the Court declined to consider either.

(R 84.)

Therefore, the statements of facts in Iverson's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment were not specifically
controverted and are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion.
Florence's claim to an oral contract arises out of
an alleged extension of a written contract.

The written

contract, attached hereto as Appendix MAW (R 89, Depo., Exhibit
1), provides that Gaddis agrees to split any commission earned
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with Florence and Iverson [the other party] on the sale of the
Karen Lee Apartments [the 120-unit complex in Granger]•

The

written contract was a result of conversations between Gaddis and
Florence, and between Florence and Iverson.

In August, 1983,

Gaddis approached Florence and asked if he had information on
apartment complexes for sale.

Florence responded that he had no

clients with such property, but knew someone who did.
Gaddis said, MGet me the information on it.

To which

I need it fast."

Thereafter, Florence contacted Iverson, who requested that
Florence obtain from Gaddis a written agreement to split the
commission if the apartment was sold.

Florence promised to get

the agreement, and Iverson promised to give the information on
the property.
After Florence had obtained the written agreement
and after Iverson had given Florence the information on the
property, Florence alleges he obtained a promise from Iverson
that should Gaddis' clients purchase any other property that
Iverson knew of, the commission arrangement would remain the
same.

(R 62-63.)

It is on this alleged promise that Florence

bases his claim for an oral contract.

(R 61-62.)

Florence's claim of an oral contract must fail for
lack of consideration.

Viewed in its most generous light, the

alleged oral promise is nothing more than an effort to broaden by
parol evidence and without any new or additional consideration,
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the scope of the written contract.

The written contract provided

that Florence was to receive from Gaddis a one-third portion of
any commission Gaddis received from the sale of the Karen Lee.
The consideration for this covenant was his bringing Gaddis and
Iverson together on the transaction.

Florence was to perform no

other duty under the contract.
At a time when he had fully performed his duty
under the written contract, having brought Gaddis and Iverson
together, Florence, under the most favorable interpretation of
his testimony, simply asked for and obtained Iverson's
acquiescence that the written contract be extended beyond its
written terms and provide that Florence receive further
compensation for his having done that which he was required to do
by the terms of the written agreement.
Under the alleged oral contract, Florence did not
undertake any new duties, did not bind himself to new or
additional promises, and did not incur any detriment.

Under any

definition of consideration, Florence's narrative is devoid of
anything which would even suggest that he gave any consideration
in exchange for the promise he claims Iverson to have made
respecting future transactions.
It is a universal rule of contract law that a
promise received without consideration is unenforceable.
v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961);
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Manwill

Vance v. Connell,

96 Idaho 417, 529 P.2d 1289 (1974); Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 39
(Wyo. 1983).

Therefore, even if the alleged promise to keep the

commission arrangement the same on the sale of other property had
been given, it is unenforceable for lack of consideration.
Iverson is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law because the alleged promise is unenforceable.
B.

The absence of agreement by Gaddis to the alleged

oral contract is fatal to the formation of the claimed contract.
Iverson is further entitled to summary judgment
because the language of the alleged promise to Florence purports
to set up a tri-lateral agreement, and the agreement of Gaddis,
the third essential party was never obtained.

Florence does not

contend that Gaddis ever agreed, orally or otherwise, to share
future commissions with Florence.
Florence testified that Iverson agreed to his
statement that "the commission arrangement will remain the same
on this one or any other property that Gaddis' buyers buy."
(R 89, Depo., p.10.)

It is upon this that Florence bases his

claim that a binding contract had been formed.

(R 61-62.)

This

is insufficient to create a binding contract to share a future,
unidentified and unidentifiable commission among the three
persons because Gaddis, the person who agreed to share his Karen
Lee commission, is not even claimed to have given his consent to
the agreement.

Indeed, there is nothing to suggest that he was

-10-

aware of the claim that there was a commitment respecting future
commissions.
The written contract, upon which the alleged oral
contract is based, provided that Gaddis agreed to split any
commission earned between the three parties.

See Appendix "A."

There was no agreement under the written contract that Iverson
would split any fee he received from Gaddis, nor was there an
agreement by Iverson that if Gaddis did not pay part of the
commissions to Florence, Iverson would pay a portion of what he
received to Florence.

Therefore, Florence has no cause of action

against Iverson.
Florence testified that the oral contract provided
that the commission arrangement would remain the same on any
subsequent sales.

As Gaddis was the realtor who would receive

the commission check on the sale, it would be necessary to obtain
his agreement if a new contract or change to the existing
contract were to arise.

In granting Gaddis' motion for summary

judgment, this Court necessarily ruled that there was no contract
between Florence and Gaddis respecting the later sale.

If Gaddis

is not bound, the contract is incomplete at best and Iverson
cannot be bound.

It follows that no new or modified contract has

arisen among the parties to the first agreement.
C.

There are no genuine issues of material fact with

respect to the alleged oral contract.
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In his Brief, Florence states that a material
factual dispute exists as to whether the alleged promise was made
before or after he had completed his duties under the written
agreement.

In so contending, Florence points out a discrepancy

in the dates set forth that the alleged conversation was to have
taken place.

The question is whether it took place on the 25th

or 26th of August.
immaterial.

This question of fact, however, is

Florence has admitted that the conversation in which

the alleged promise was given took place after he had delivered
Iverson the written agreement and Iverson had delivered to
Florence the information on the Karen Lee Apartments.
para. 5.)

(R 62-63,

Therefore, whether the conversation took place on the

25th or 26th does not change the fact that Florence gave no
consideration to Iverson for the alleged promise, nor does it
change the fact that a necessary party to the alleged contract
does not consent to an extension to the original contract.
Florence also argues that summary judgment is
precluded because the facts necessary to establish a lack of
consideration were not conclusively established in the record.
However, because of Rule 2(h), Rules of Practice in the Third
Judicial District Court, the necessary facts are deemed admitted.
Taking the facts in a light most favorable to
Florence, Iverson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of
an oral contract.
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POINT II
The Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant1s
cause against Respondent should be affirmed
because Appellant's own testimony shows that
he does not qualify to benefit under the
alleged implied agreement, and because the law
of the case heretofore decided bars recovery
under the implied agreement alleged.
In his Complaint, Florence claimed a right to a split
of commissions on the sale of the Brittany Apartments based on an
"implied agreement arising from the custom and trade practices in
the real estate brokerage profession to divide fees equally when
more than one broker is involved in a real estate sales project."
(R 1.)

Iverson is entitled to summary judgment on this

contention for two reasons: First, Florence does not qualify as a
party to an implied agreement based on custom and trade practice;
and second, the law of the case was either that no implied
agreement exists or that Florence did not qualify as a party to
an implied agreement*
A.

Florence does not qualify as a party to any implied

agreement•
In his deposition, Florence defined the custom and
trade practice relied upon in his Complaint, which created the
alleged implied agreement, as a practice of splitting commissions
"based upon the participation of the brokers..."
pp. 41-42.)

(R 89, Depo.,

Therefore, in order to recover under an implied

agreement, Florence would have had to have participated in the
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sale of the Brittany Apartments.

It is uncontested that Florence

did no work with respect to the sale of the Brittany Apartments
(R. 63/ para. 6.); he did not participate in any manner.

Under

the terms of his definition, Florence could not benefit from the
alleged implied agreement since he did notf by his own testimony,
participate in transactions from which he claims a commission.
(R 89, Depo., p. 46.). Therefore, he is not entitled to recover
under his theory of implied agreement based on custom or trade
practice.
B.

The law of the case is that Florence is not

entitled to recover on the basis of an implied agreement.
Iverson is entitled to summary judgment on the
claim for recovery under the theory of implied agreement because
he stands in no different position than Gaddis in relation to
Florence, insofar as the claimed implied agreement is concerned.
(R 84, Depo., pp. 41-44.)

In ruling on Gaddis' motion for

summary judgment, the Court below necessarily concluded that
Florence was not entitled to recover on his theory of implied
agreement for either one of two reasons: Either because there was
no custom or trade practice which would create such an agreement,
or because Florence did not qualify as a party to the agreement.
Florence has not appealed the summary judgment dismissing the
action against Gaddis with prejudice.

This became the law of the

case and Iverson cannot be charged under an agreement to share a
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Gaddis commission when Gaddis has already been freed from any
obligation to share that very same commission.

It would follow

that the lower Court's decision granting judgment in favor of
Gaddis applies with equal force to Florence's claim against
Iverson and precludes judgment against Iverson.
C.

There are no genuine issues of material fact with

respect to the alleged implied contract.
In his Brief, Florence states that there is an
issue of fact as to the existence of a custom or trade practice
to divide fees.

This issue, it is contended, was raised by an

affidavit of Bernard C. Fallentine which stated that there was a
custom to divide commissions.
before the Court.

However, this affidavit was not

In granting Iverson's motion for summary

judgment, the affidavit was excluded from consideration as it was
not timely filed.

(R. 74, 84, 86.)

Therefore, the affidavit

cannot be used to raise an issue of material fact.

Had the

Fallentine affidavit been before the Court, it would still follow
that a practice which did not bind Gaddis to split the commission
he received on the sale could not bind Iverson to a tri-partite
implied agreement•
Even should this Court determine that an issue of
fact exists as to existence of a custom or trade practice, the
issue would not be material because any trade practice is based
on participation, and it is undisputed that Florence did not
participate in any way in the subject transaction, the sale of
the Brittany Apartments.
-15-

CONCLUSION
It is clear that no genuine issue of material fact
exists which if decided in favor of Florence would preclude
summary judgment with regard to the alleged oral contract; it is
uncontested that Florence gave no new consideration for the
subsequent promise, and there is no claim by Florence that the
necessary third party to the agreement consented to share any
future commission.

With regard to the alleged implied agreement,

granting of summary judgment to Gaddis precludes judgment for
Florence against Iverson on that point.

Florence did not

participate in the sale of the apartments, which participation
is, by his own statement, a condition precedent to recovery under
the implied agreement alleged.
The summary judgment dismissing the claim against
Iverson should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of December, 1985.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of December,
1985, a true and correct copy of RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was served on
the Appellant by hand delivering a copy thereof to:
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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GADDIS
INVESTMENTS

(T. C tfV-5'7^)

August 25t 1983

1

*

Cal Florence
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Cal:
This letter will confirm our agreement that I agree to
split any commission earned,regarding the sale of
approximately 120 unit complex in Granger, three w a y s —
Gaddis Investment, yourself, and the other party.
Maximum commission will be 1*5%.
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I
APPENDIX

"A"
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